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TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Steve Charnovitz*
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is frequently criticized for insufficient transparency and for a lack of participatory opportunities for private individuals and civic society. 1 For example, consider the views of Lori Wallach, one of the most prominent opponents of the WTO. 2 In a recently-published "comprehensive guide to the WTO" coauthored by Wallach and her colleague Patrick Woodall, a series of criticisms were leveled, including the following: WTO business is conducted by committees and panels that meet behind closed doors in Geneva, Switzerland.
. . . .
In sharp contrast to domestic courts and even other international agreements, at the WTO there is a startling lack of transparency, public disclosure or accountability.
. . . [T]
he WTO is intentionally designed to insulate against democratic pressure for change. 3 Because Wallach is an outsider to the WTO, it would be fair to balance her views against what the insiders are saying. One insider and frequent WTO defender is James Bacchus, a former U.S. Congressman and an original member of the WTO Appellate Body who served on that tribunal longer than anyone else. 4 We must open the doors of the WTO. We need to let in the light of public scrutiny-let the 6 billion people in the world who are served by the WTO see the organization as it really is.
. . . . . . . Those who oppose the WTO can portray it in the distorted way they do only because, by keeping the doors closed, the organization's members make it possible, and seemingly credible, for them to do so. 5 In my opinion, Wallach and Bacchus stand as far apart as two people can be on the overall merits for humanity of the WTO and international trade. Yet both share the view that the WTO is deficient with respect to its openness.
I agree with such criticism and join others in this symposium to urge that the WTO promote greater public understanding and citizen participation. My specific contribution will be to point out the common thread between the norms espoused by the WTO for national transparency and the analogous norms now lacking within the WTO as an organization. Promoting transparency and participation in each of the two levels of governance-national and international-will be mutually reinforcing and serve to enhance governmental accountability.
This article proceeds in the following manner. Part I explores the development in international trade law of the norm for transparency and participation at the national level. Part II describes the WTO's practices regarding openness and public participation, and then criticizes the current limitations. In doing so, I discuss why the WTO's norms for national government should be applied to the international trading system and why administrative law principles are relevant to the WTO. Part III proposes several new steps for the WTO to take to promote transparency and participation. Part IV concludes.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL TRANSPARENCY NORM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
Although I am unaware of any historical study of the emergence of international norms on transparency and citizen participation, some key moments are apparent. One foundational development was Immanuel Kant's attention to "capacity for publicity" in his essay Perpetual Peace (1795). 6 In Kant's view, the "transcendental formula of public right" (or public law) is that " [a] ll actions that affect the rights of other men are wrong if their maxim is not consistent with publicity." 7 An important intergovernmental action was the inclusion of Article 18 in the Treaty of Versailles providing that "[e]very treaty or international" agreement shall be registered by the Secretariat of the League of Nations and "shall as soon as possible be published by it [,] " and, furthermore, that "[n]o such treaty or international engagement shall be binding until so registered." 8 These developments may have provided intellectual context for the emergence of transparency as an issue of international trade law.
The foundation stone of international norms for transparency was the 1923 International Convention Relating to the Simplification of Customs Formalities ("Customs Convention"). 9 The Customs Convention established rules for transparency and review at the national level. 10 All customs regulations were required to be promptly published "in such a manner as to enable persons concerned to become acquainted with them and to avoid the prejudice which might result from the application of customs formalities of which they are ignorant." 11 Moreover, no customs regulations were to be enforced before being published unless "previous publication would be likely to injure the essential interests of the [regulating] country." 12 With regard to import and export licenses, the Customs Convention dictated that the conditions to be fulfilled "should be brought immediately in the clearest and most definite form to the notice of the public." 13 Following implementation of a regulation, the Convention directed states to use "the most appropriate measures by their national legislation and administration, both to prevent the arbitrary or unjust application of their laws [,] . . . and to ensure redress by administrative, judicial or arbitral procedure for those who may have been prejudiced by such abuses." 14 If a dispute arose between the parties on these commitments, either party could refer the matter to the Permanent Court of International Justice. 15 16 This international customs law is remarkable in its modernity. The Customs Convention supervises the domestic policy process, and the designated beneficiaries are not only the parties to the Convention but also "persons concerned," 17 a class that could include domestic persons as well as aliens. Furthermore, the Convention's rules are backed up by dispute settlement. It is also interesting to note that the Protocol to the Convention contains what is now called a "savings clause" 18 to defer to past or future international treaties relating to the preservation of the health of human beings, animals, or plants and to the protection of public morals or international security. 19 The Convention itself lacks any provision about transparency and nongovernmental participation in the Convention's implementation. 20 No historical account of the Convention's implementation is readily available, and I do not know the extent of transparency attained. In general, the economic activities of the League of Nations did feature considerable transparency and some private participation. 21 The Convention's history is clear in one interesting respect, namely, an unusually inclusive negotiating process. 22 The depth of the Convention's commitment to transparency can be traced to the extensive participation by the International Chamber of Commerce publication, but not to the rule about prompt publication. Id. art. 22, para. 3. For that rule, the parties had to agree on referring the dispute to an arbitral or judicial procedure. Id. art. 22, para. 1. In ratifying the Customs Convention, Roumania declared its understanding that Article 22 applies to questions of a general nature, with "private persons being only entitled to appeal to their own judicial authorities." Id., at 165. (1923) . The feature that was unusual about the 1923 conference was that the International Chamber of Commerce participated extensively. RIDGEWAY, supra, at 225. As George Ridgeway explained, the conference negotiations utilized the common feature of national government in which interested groups are given an opportunity to assist in shaping law. See RIDGEWAY, supra, at 212-13.
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in the Convention's drafting process. 23 As historian George L. Ridgeway pointed out, "[t]he influence of the International Chamber was particularly noteworthy in the formation of policy on the subjects of publicity, treatment of commercial travelers and samples, and redress." 24 The Customs Convention episode provides a good illustration of the symbiosis between transparency and participation at the national and international levels because nongovernmental participation in an international conference was an important factor in getting governments to establish better norms for transparency at the national level. The fact that this norm developed so early in the international trade regime, rather than in other regimes, may be because transnational private interactions are the very essence of international trade. 25 By contrast, other international regimes were able to operate for a long time without much attention to the domestic regulatory process. 26 For example, the international labor regime developed contemporaneously with the trade regime and yet the organic act of 1919 creating the International Labour Organization (ILO) omits considerations of transparency or due process at the national level. 27 Not until 1960 did the ILO get around to giving concerted attention to the need for norms at the national level to improve governmental decisionmaking. 28 In that year, the ILO approved Recommendation 113 concerning consultation and co-operation between public authorities and employers' and workers' organisations at the industrial and national levels. 29 Among its purposes, the Recommendation aims to ensure that governments seek the views of these organizations in "the preparation and implementation of laws and regulations affecting their interests." 30 Note that the ILO's initial lack of transparency norms for governments stood in sharp contrast to its pathbreaking norms for the participation of nonstate actors-in particular, employer and worker organizations-in all ILO activities. 31 When the United Nations convened negotiations on international trade in 1946, the governments used the Customs Convention as a reference point for writing new rules on the customs process. 32 One might have expected the governments to build on and strengthen the disciplines in that Convention. Yet as John H. Jackson has pointed out, what happened instead is that some of the provisions of the 1923 Convention were watered down to the point where the Charter of the International Trade Organization ("ITO") 33 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT") "represented a backward step." 34 In regard to transparency, the major difference between the Customs Simplification Convention and GATT Article X (Publication and Administration of Trade Regulations), in my view, is that Article X's disciplines 35 while the corresponding provisions in the Convention do not contain that limitation. 37 In regard to the review of administrative action, the disciplines in the Convention and the GATT are similar except on one important point in which the GATT goes further. 38 The GATT requires that the review of administrative action regarding customs matters be done by tribunals or procedures that are "independent" of the agency that took the contested administrative action. 39 In contrast, the Convention's provision for "redress" lacked an independence requirement. 40 From 1948 to 1995, only one case occurred in which a government's trade measure was challenged pursuant to GATT Article X and found to be a violation. 41 That was the 1989 decision in European Economic Community -Restrictions on Imports of Apples, a complaint by the United States. 42 One charge in that dispute was that the European Economic Community ("EEC") had imposed a quota on apples effective February 14, 1988 yet did not publish the regulation until April 20, 1988. 43 While noting that such publication met Article X:1's requirement that measures "be published promptly," the panel, nevertheless, held that the EEC's quota violated Article X:1 because (as the panel saw it) the provision prohibits "back-dated quotas." 44 The panel's reasoning is a bit hard to understand, however, because its decision reveals no arguments by the complaining government for the Article X violation. 45 Litigation has occurred a bit more frequently in the WTO and the tendency of adjudicators has largely been deferential to national law. 46 For 37. Compare GATT, supra note 34, art. X, paras. 1, 2 (requiring publication of "[l]aws, regulations, judicial decisions and administrative rulings of general application"), with Customs Convention, supra note 9, art. 4 (requiring publication of "all regulations relating to customs and similar formalities").
38. Compare GATT, supra note 34, art. X, para. 3(b) with Customs Convention, supra note 9, art. 7. 48 The plaintiff government Costa Rica appealed some matters in Cotton Underwear, which gave the Appellate Body an opportunity in 1997 to expound GATT Article X. In its decision, the Appellate Body stated:
Article X:2, General Agreement, may be seen to embody a principle of fundamental importance -that of promoting full disclosure of governmental acts affecting Members and private persons and enterprises, whether of domestic or foreign nationality. The relevant policy principle is widely known as the principle of transparency and has obviously [sic] due process dimensions. The essential implication is that Members and other persons affected, or likely to be affected, by governmental measures imposing restraints, requirements and other burdens, should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about such measures and accordingly to protect and adjust their activities or alternatively to seek modification of such measures. 49 This is a significant interpretation because very few of the disciplines in GATT are generally thought to encompass persons and enterprises of domestic nationality vis-à-vis their own government. 50 Here the Appellate Body recognizes the fundamental nature of the transparency principle in GATT Article X:2 and its importance to private persons and enterprises on both sides of a transborder http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2004) (reversing the panel and holding that the discipline in Article X:3(a) applies only to the administration of laws, regulations, etc., not to the laws and regulations themselves). In a subsequent case, the Appellate Body explained that complaints about the "substantive content" of national trade rules would not come within the scope of Article X. transaction. 51 Moreover, the Appellate Body sees a "due process" dimension to transparency, and seems to suggest that Article X has implications not only for WTO Members but also for "other persons" who should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire the information about a customs measure that will enable them either to adjust their activities or to go to a government "to seek modification of such measures." 52 This is the first caselaw of the WTO to explicitly make the connection between information transparency for the public and the ability of the affected individual to act on the information by participating in a government's administrative review process. 53 The Appellate Body returned to GATT Article X in the United States -Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products case. 54 At issue was whether the U.S. import ban on shrimp could be justified under the General Exceptions in GATT Article XX. 55 Sua sponte, the Appellate Body stated that GATT Article X:3 could aid in the interpretation of Article XX because Article X:3 "establishes certain minimum standards for transparency and procedural fairness in the administration of trade regulations . . . . " 56 The issue of procedural fairness had arisen because the Appellate Body had found that the U.S. government denied "basic fairness and due process" to foreign governments applying for certification under the U.S. shrimp-turtle regulation. 57 The transparency and review principles in GATT Article X served as an inspiration to governments in the drafting of analogous provisions in many of the new Uruguay Round agreements for goods, services, and intellectual property. 58 For example, the provisions in GATT Articles X:1 and X:2 on publication are reflected in Provisions to provide private participatory rights and opportunities at the national level are present in many of WTO subagreements. 69 For example, the Agreement on Safeguards states that a government's investigation shall provide for public hearings (or other appropriate means) in which importers, exporters, and other interested parties can present evidence and their views. 70 The GATS states that where appropriate, WTO Members "shall work in cooperation with relevant intergovernmental and nongovernmental organisations towards the establishment and adoption of common international standards and criteria for recognition" for the practice of relevant services trades and professions. 71 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) provides that before adopting a standard, a national standardizing body is to allow a period of at least 60 days for interested parties to submit comments on the draft standard (unless urgent problems arise). 72 Furthermore, the standardizing body is required to "take into account" such comments. 73 The Antidumping Agreement has an Article on "Public Notice and Explanation of Determinations" and also requires that the antidumping adjudication provide opportunities for interested parties to provide evidence and for consumer organizations to provide information. 74 expansive demands came in the negotiations with China. 76 As Julia Ya Qin has pointed out, China agreed to provide an opportunity for public comment on all new draft laws and regulations affecting trade. 77 Qin notes that this "mandatory public comment period clearly exceeds the requirements of existing WTO rules." 78 In summary, with regard to its oversight of national trade and trade-related regulation, WTO law requires governments to maintain a large degree of transparency and some degree of participation for the benefit of traders and other interested persons. 79 This law demonstrates an acknowledgement by governments that transparency and participation are important ingredients in good governance at the national level.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSPARENCY NORMS WITHIN THE WTO
Unfortunately, WTO member governments have adopted a different and inconsistent position with regard to norms for WTO transparency and to the participation of nonstate actors in the policy and rulemaking activities of the WTO. 80 Although the text of the WTO Agreement does not require that WTO negotiations be kept confidential and does not forbid participatory opportunities for the public, the WTO has often insisted on secrecy and resisted participation by social and economic actors. 81 That said, it needs to be noted that the zone of secrecy and insularity has continued to narrow since the WTO was born in 1995. 82 Still, a great deal of room for improvement exists.
Let me briefly summarize the current practices of the WTO regarding transparency and participation. The WTO website has many download options and features a huge collection of documents 76 available without charge. 83 For WTO legislative activities, the main exclusions are draft negotiating texts and some analyses prepared by the Secretariat. 84 For WTO judicial activities, the main exclusions are the government briefs to the panels and Appellate Body, interlocutory procedural rulings, and the panel's interim report. 85 Most documents are posted in a timely manner except for minutes of various WTO meetings which tend to lag a few months. Other than plenary sessions of WTO Ministerial Conferences, all official WTO meetings are closed to the private sector and nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"). 86 Over the past decade, however, the WTO Secretariat has organized a number of seminars, symposia, and workshops in which accredited NGOs and business representatives participate. 87 With regard to dispute settlement, all oral hearings of WTO panels and the Appellate Body are closed to the public. 88 briefs, 90 a common practice is that the Appellate Body will consider accepting an amicus brief, yet will not take it into account in deciding the case. 91 The panel practice is more variable. A trend that may be developing is that the panel makes a preliminary ruling that it will consider arguments in an amicus curiae brief only to the extent that the argument is voiced by one of the governmental parties. 92 The WTO Agreement, Article V:2, provides authority to the WTO General Council to "make appropriate arrangements for consultation and cooperation with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters related to those of the WTO." 93 Article V:2 was based on a similar institutional provision in the ITO Charter, 94 which was modeled on one in the U.N. Charter. 95 The WTO General Council implemented Article V:2 in 1996 by enacting Guidelines for Arrangements with NGOs. 96 These Guidelines delineate a narrow role for NGOs based on the following rationale:
As a result of extensive discussions, there is currently a broadly held view that it would not be possible for NGOs to be directly involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings. Closer consultation and cooperation with NGOs can also be met constructively through appropriate processes at the national level where lies primary responsibility for taking into account the different elements of public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-making. 97 The General Council did not seek to explain why governments held that view and why they thought that the WTO was different from other international organizations where it is possible for NGOs to be directly involved in ongoing work and to observe it firsthand. Furthermore, the Council did not explain why the national level has the primary responsibility to take into account different elements of the public interest on trade policymaking, and if so, what remains as the raison d'être of the WTO. The narrowness of the assumption undergirding the Guidelines shows that a great deal more transparency and inclusion could be achieved by the WTO without having to renegotiate the treaty.
What would be the rationale for such a reform? In my view, the different positions espoused by the WTO for states and for itself cannot be reconciled. Prescribing outwardly to the national level, the WTO pushes the boundaries of international law regarding the need for transparency and participation. Yet in self-government, the WTO resists adopting features of transparency and participation practiced in other international organizations.
That inconsistent stance is troubling. Simply put, the WTO should practice what it preaches. The "principle of fundamental importance" articulated by the Appellate Body in the Cotton Underwear case that WTO members "and other persons affected, or likely to be affected, by governmental measures . . . should have a reasonable opportunity to acquire authentic information about such measures and accordingly to protect and adjust their activities or alternatively to seek modification of such measures" applies just as much to WTO measures as it does to national measures. 98 The position expressed in the Guidelines that NGOs should limit their participation to the national level is based on an orthodox view of international relations. The key assumption is that states are the only relevant actors in international relations and that states should speak with a unitary voice to each other. Within each state, it is entirely appropriate for the ruling government to solicit the views of domestic (or foreign) actors in the setting of trade policy. 99 At the WTO, however, it is thought that the flow of ideas has to be channeled through member governments.
In my view, this position may be coherent in the abstract, but is inappropriate for life on a planet that shares a common environment and increasingly, a common economy and social community. By denying the opportunity for NGOs to observe and participate more in WTO activities, the WTO is undermining its opportunity to promote greater transparency, participation, and accountability at the national level. Certainly, the WTO sets a bad example. Even worse, the WTO's reputation for secretiveness and single-mindedness may make it harder to maintain public support for the world trading system.
For instance, in the United States, the 2002 law providing trade promotion authority passed the U.S. House of Representatives by three votes. 100 That law sets U.S. objectives for WTO negotiations, and one objective, on "Transparency," calls for "public access for appropriate meetings, proceedings, and submissions" to and at the WTO. 101 If this U.S. objective remains unrequited, then future Congressional votes regarding the WTO may not go as positively.
A. Administrative Law at the WTO 102
The politics aside, some conceptual issues call for attention. A core question is whether the WTO's requirements for publication, notice and comment, and judicial review at the national level are relevant principles to be applied reflexively to the intergovernmental WTO. Similar requirements at the national level are generally understood as a means to promote the accountability of and democratic control over administrative agencies operating with delegated authority from lawmakers. But is the WTO an international administrative agency to which such principles might logically be applied?
The WTO does not lend itself to easy typologies, but in my view, it can be seen as an international administrative agency. The member governments that established the WTO endowed it with "such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions," and also provided that WTO officials would have the privileges and immunities necessary for the "independent exercise" of their functions. 103 The main functions of the WTO are to "facilitate the implementation, administration and operation, and further the objectives" of the WTO Agreement, and to "provide the forum for [trade]negotiations." 104 During the course of trade negotiations, the WTO Members may agree to make amendments to WTO law and to the schedules containing national commitments on trade in goods and services. 105 Some might resist the notion of the WTO as an administrative agency on the grounds that it is a legislative body, but that claim is weak. Because trade negotiations are so central to the WTO's mission, the WTO could be characterized as an international legislature. As a legislature, however, the WTO has an unusual decision rule. In general, any action by the WTO requires consensus. 106 Moreover, even after an amendment to the WTO is approved, that amendment has to be accepted by a member government before becoming binding on that government. 107 Thus, member governments do not transfer or cede lawmaking power to the WTO.
On the other hand, some might embrace the notion of the WTO as an administrative agency on the false grounds that governments delegate decisionmaking authority to it, yet such a claim is mistaken. 108 A state cannot delegate authority that it does not have and none of the international functions of the WTO are accomplishable by a solitary state. What has happened instead is that governments have established and joined the WTO, agreed to abstain from practices that violate WTO law, and assigned the WTO certain functions for promoting trade cooperation. 109 The governments have also assigned adjudicatory and compliance functions to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and its panels and Appellate Body. 110 Although some might argue that governments have delegated judicial (or quasi-judicial) authority to the Appellate Body, that claim is faulty because there was no pre-existing national jurisdiction to adjudicate a foreign government's compliance with WTO law. 111 Instead, the governments have created a judicial function at the WTO.
The feature of the WTO that most renders it an administrative agency is that the principals-that is, the Members-have given the WTO competence as their joint agent to carry out certain discrete international functions. Because the Members are incorporeal, they must act through various agents including WTO "officials" and "the representatives of the Members." 112 Within each government, the representative of that Member tends to be an Executive official. 113 Thus, from the perspective of a national legislature, the WTO resembles an administrative agency in the sense that it makes decisions that affect a domestic polity and yet extend beyond the direct legislative control of national elected officials. 114 It is that similarity to the domestic agency that forms the basis for the application of administrative law principles to the WTO itself. Just as a legislature would impose administrative law on a domestic agency to make it more fair, transparent, and accountable, that legislature could conceptualize a similar role for the application of administrative law principles to the WTO. 115 In doing so, the legislature (or the electorate) might have two targets in mind: one will be the WTO and its decisionmaking. The other will be the government's own representatives to the WTO for which WTO secrecy may present a barrier to effective parliamentary (and public) 110 oversight. 116 Since each WTO Member's interaction with the WTO is carried out through bureaucrats, diplomats, and occasionally ministers, there is a continuing need to achieve accountability for the authority that diplomatic and bureaucratic agents exercise at the WTO. 117 The most obvious context for such accountability is the chain from the agent in Geneva to elected officials at home and then outward to the national citizenry. Yet in a world economy and in an organization like the WTO that operates by consensus, more inclusive and complex chains of accountability may be desirable. 118 Legal the international level, 120 they may nevertheless help in thinking through an appropriate and effective process for international governance. 121 Indeed, two different ideas-the pluralist and the civic republican-may be relevant. The pluralist will seek to open up governance and to provide opportunities for the participation of dueling interest groups in the decisionmaking process; the civic republican will seek governance decisions that relate to a public value discovered through deliberation. 122 The traditional administrative law model fits the WTO in some respects, yet fails to fit when it comes to judicial review of WTO actions. What fits is that principals at the national level can demand that WTO-level rulemaking and adjudications be appropriately transparent and adhere to accepted norms of due process. Where a gap exists is that there is no international judicial control on the WTO as an administrative agency, and so that central dimension of administrative law is absent. This issue is not as new as it may seem. 124 The idea of judicial review of the multilateral trading system was discussed in the United Nations economic negotiations of 1946-48, and a provision was included in the ITO to permit Members to ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion regarding a decision by the ITO Conference of all Members. 125 Because the ITO did not go into force, this provision was never used. Nevertheless, one of the U.S. negotiators, Seymour Rubin-later a highly-respected figure in the community of U.S. international lawyers 126 -anticipated that the "growth of international administrative agencies" would eventually draw upon legal developments at the domestic level in administrative law and 
B. Improving WTO Transparency and Participation
The question of whether individuals and NGOs should be able to observe and participate in the WTO is highly contested. 128 In my view, the position espoused in the WTO Guidelines-namely, that the participation of individuals and NGOs in trade policymaking should occur only at the national level-is undesirable on ethical as well as pragmatic grounds. Let me briefly note six reasons underlying my conclusion.
First, the notion that citizen views should be channeled only through WTO member governments disadvantages individuals who live in countries that are not democratic. 129 The General Council's Guidelines suggest that the national level has the primary responsibility for taking into account the different elements of public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-making, and yet the WTO treaty does not convey a responsibility for member governments to be democratic. 130 The Guidelines might make more sense if all WTO member governments had robust democratic accountability. Unfortunately, however, many do not. For example, Angola, Bahrain, China, Congo, Cuba, The Gambia, Haiti, Myanmar, Oman, Qatar, Rwanda, and Uganda are among WTO member countries that do not appear on Freedom House's 2003 list of electoral democracies. 131 In response to this point about non- democratic states at the WTO, Philip Nichols has retorted that the factors that preclude constituent "participation at the national level will also preclude participation at the international level." 132 In my view, Nichols is too pessimistic on that point.
Second, the lack of openness toward NGOs disenfranchises individuals who live in countries that have not yet been allowed to join the WTO. 133 For example, many people live in WTO-applicant countries such as Belarus, Ethiopia, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Ukraine, Vietnam, and Yemen. 134 None of that population has any direct representation in WTO policymaking. 135 This is also true for WTO accession negotiations in which the WTO negotiates the terms for a country to join the WTO, 136 without making any effort to seek the views of interested parties in that country. One wonders how the denizens of non-democratic countries feel about the WTO's disinterest in consulting them.
Third, the WTO's weaknesses in external transparency and participation are especially disabling for individuals from nonpowerful countries. Even when those countries-which tend to be in the South rather than the North-have perfect democracies, the views of citizens and constituents have to be routed to the WTO through a government which may be too weak to have its voice heard or heeded. 137 In contemporary WTO practice, weak governments are often marginalized in WTO decisionmaking. 138 to) the current assymmetries of national power, rather than reinforce those imbalances. 139 Fourth, although it is sometimes suggested that the WTO's practice of consensus decision-making 140 means that individuals who can convince their own government to take a particular stance in the WTO can prevent the WTO from taking action in conflict with that stance, 141 this view leaves out the fact that an individual will not only want to prevent the WTO from doing what she perceives to be bad, but will also want to get the WTO to achieve good ends. Persuading one's own (WTO member) government is a good start to the task of convincing all 147 WTO member governments. 142 The most efficient place to conduct such discourse will sometimes be at the central marketplace for trade policy, that is, at the WTO. Yet perversely, the WTO General Council continues to insist on a localization of advocacy activities despite the higher transactions costs that accrue to individuals and NGOs. 143 The WTO will also be an advantageous spot for observation of the trade negotiation process. If an individual wants to monitor how well her own government is negotiating at the WTO, the best place to do that may be in (2004) ("States need not worry that policies will be forced upon them. To the extent that national decision makers are democratically accountable, therefore, they serve as guardians of the interests of their citizens.").
142. See PETER SINGER, ONE WORLD 75 (2nd ed. 2002) (criticizing the WTO website for saying that consensus decision-making is more democratic than majority rule and explaining that consensus decision-making favors the status quo).
143. See NGO Guidelines, supra note 96. Higher transaction costs are likely to ensue when an NGO from WTO Member N1 has to devise lobbying strategies for decentralized lobbying in Members N1 to N148 rather than at the WTO headquarters in Geneva.
144. See Howse, supra note 117, at 89 (stating that the presence of NGO monitoring at the level of negotiations can help to reduce agency costs).
Fifth, by conceptualizing the trade debate as being decentered within national units, the WTO reinforces the tendencies of economic nationalism to dominate trade policy. 145 The "different elements of public interest which are brought to bear on trade policy-making" at the national level tend to be dominated by the financial interests of import-competing industries. 146 Other elements of the public interest-including volitions for free trade, environmental protection or the alleviation of world poverty-may be disadvantaged in a debate that is purposefully segmented by homeland.
Furthermore, the attitude reflected in the WTO's NGO Guidelines seems to assume that the trade debate at the national level should funnel in only internal views, and that WTO itself should refuse to hear views not pronounced by a government. 147 involved in the work of the WTO or its meetings. 149 Sixth, the resistance of the WTO to providing opportunities for a dialogue with nongovernmental actors reduces the competition of ideas and reinforces status quo thinking. 150 The insulated status quo may be trade-centric and market-based, or it may be mercantilist and pro-producer. Regardless of what values dominate on a particular issue, the debate within the WTO can be truncated because of limited voices and the lack of an interplay of ideas. To be sure, there is a robust debate about trade and its implications in Geneva and throughout the world. Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that all of the best ideas for trade policymaking get communicated and vetted in the rarified atmosphere at the WTO. 151 From a civic republican perspective, enhancing nongovernmental participation may engender more deliberative decisionmaking at the WTO. 152 In summary, the WTO continues to make progress toward full transparency, but has stalled in effecting opportunities for constructive participation by NGOs and the private sector. Although this situation is often criticized, few analysts have made the further point that the WTO's insularity contradicts its promotion of participation in the trade law administration of WTO member governments. Sooner or later, the normative dissonance involved in going in two directions at once will force a reassessment at the WTO. My hope and expectation is that the WTO will revise its internal rules to provide meaningful opportunities for public participation and to promote procedural fairness and regularity as a means of enhancing accountability and legitimacy. In doing so, the WTO can be aided by insights drawn from the field of administrative law. 153 The coming challenge will be to fruitfully transplant principles developed for a national context to the WTO. 154 
III. FUTURE STEPS FOR THE WTO
Part III presents several proposals for how the WTO can do more to enhance transparency and participation both at the national level and at the WTO. Section A addresses the national level and Section B addresses improvements needed inside the WTO.
A. National Level
The most obvious future direction for WTO negotiations is to strengthen the obligations in WTO agreements for domestic transparency and participation at the national level. Unfortunately, very little of this will be accomplished in the current WTO negotiating round. The major issue that had been on the table was transparency in government procurement, but in August 2004, the WTO General Council decided to drop that issue from the negotiations. 155 Besides the procedural dimension of national transparency, there is also a substantive dimension, and it would still be possible for WTO negotiations to make progress in that area. By a substantive dimension, I mean attention to government restrictions on the inward flow of information. One serious problem today is that some governments, such as China, restrict transborder trade in informational services provided through the internet. 156 Such restrictions should be attacked in ongoing GATS negotiations. 157 Yet in the most recent trade negotiations, the WTO has moved away from these restrictive practices. In the days leading up to the August 2004 decision, 158 the WTO Secretariat posted the draft texts. 159 By contrast, the WTO has not made improvements in participatory opportunities in the various WTO committees, bodies, councils, etc. 160 No modalities exist for the public to offer comments to negotiators as to how the Doha Round objectives might be achieved. 161 The WTO's obstinacy can be contrasted to the openness shown in the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas, where the governments have set up a Civil Society Committee, which issued an "Open and Ongoing Invitation" for civil society to provide written contributions to the governments. 162 All (or nearly all) of the comments received since 2000 are posted on the FTAA website. 163 In my view, the WTO should follow this enlightened practice from the Americas.
B. Improvements Inside the WTO
Rulemaking
WTO entities have also refused to solicit public comments in ongoing rulemaking functions. For example, in April 2004, the WTO Appellate Body circulated a set of draft amendments to its Working Procedures and invited member governments to submit comments. 164 The Appellate Body, however, did not ask for comments from the public or from private attorneys that regularly practice before it in representing governments. 165 In 2000, the WTO's TBT Committee enacted a decision on "Principles for the Development of International Standards." 166 Despite the implications of this decision for activities outside the WTO, the TBT Committee did not seek public comments.
The WTO's hidebound attitude about participation differs from that of some other international organizations that have embraced new e-government technologies to seek input from the public. For example, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's Clean Development Mechanism, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation have begun to seek public comments on new proposals. 167 there will be a greater need for a "Global Register" to announce opportunities for public comment. 168 There will also need to be efficient mechanisms for reading and analyzing public comments to international organizations as the number of comments increases.
Dispute Settlement
The benefits of greater transparency are especially compelling for WTO dispute settlement, the one area of WTO law where nonconsensus decisionmaking is imposed. In the eyes of many observers, however, the non-transparency required by WTO dispute rules has served to undermine the legitimacy of panel and Appellate Body decisions. 169 Recently, the U.S. government sought to open up panel hearings in the Biotech Products case, but the other complaining parties refused to go along. 170 The U.S. government has been more successful in bilateral free trade negotiations, where its prospective trading partners have agreed to transparency in dispute panels. For example, the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement states that parties have "a right to at least one hearing before the panel and that [any] . . . such hearing [s] shall be open to the public." 171 A body of analysis already exists about the limited progress made by WTO panels and the Appellate Body in accepting amicus curiae briefs, 172 and so that situation will not be reviewed here except to make one point. The Appellate Body ought to be more transparent about what it learns from amicus briefs. For example in the Softwood Lumber Final Determination decision in 2004, the Appellate Body reported that it had received a brief from the Indigenous Network on Economies and Trade and a joint brief from Defenders of Wildlife, the Natural Resources Defense Council, and the Northwest Ecosystem Alliance. 173 Without revealing the content of the briefs, the Appellate Body then stated that it did not find it necessary to take the two amicus curiae briefs into account in rendering its decision. 174 In a situation like that, the interested public understandably has a hard time knowing whether the Appellate Body's reasoning and conclusion would have benefited from taking the briefs into account. My recommendation is for the Appellate Body to post on its webpage each amicus brief that it receives.
A Parliamentary Body
In recent years, parliamentarians from many countries have held occasional interparliamentary conferences to discuss the WTO. 175 The most recent conference was held in September 2003 alongside the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancún, where delegates from seventy national parliaments and five regional parliaments participated. 176 The declaration adopted by the parliamentarians called for a "parliamentary dimension to international trade negotiations and arrangements." 177 Although about thirty members of the U.S. Congress made the journey to Cancún, none of them participated in the inter-parliamentary conference. 178 Based on interviews, Gregory Shaffer concluded that "[t]he US government and US Congress generally are not supportive of global inter-parliamentarian meetings." 179 In my view, this attitude by the U.S. Congress is short-sighted and misses an opportunity for elected officials to learn from other parliaments. Recently, David Skaggs, a former member of the U.S. House of Representatives, suggested that "an increased role for national parliamentarians and Congresspersons and for national and international NGOs should have a direct bearing on the public's sense of the WTO system's legitimacy and trustworthiness." 180 
IV. CONCLUSION
The WTO continues to be criticized by friends and foes for its penchant for secrecy and its resistance to more open, inclusive participatory practices. Moreover, the friends point out how the WTO's closed doors give traction to the foes of world trade order. Eventually, WTO member governments will reach a consensus that reforms are needed. 181 In my view, the sooner the better.
In this article, I make the case for rewriting the 1996 NGO Guidelines 182 so as to provide meaningful opportunities for nongovernmental participation in WTO operations. The article describes the historical roots of the trade transparency norm, analyzes the WTO text and related judicial interpretations, and then seeks to show that the norms for national trade administration should be honored by the WTO. While I do not contend that the connection between national trade and international trade law is seamless, I do contend that the administrative law principles applicable to a national government are relevant to rulemaking and adjudication in international organizations. 183 As citizens of a nation and denizens of the world, our aspirations for good governance cannot be cabined within the nation-state. 
